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ABSTRACT
This paper studies empirically the effects of and the interactions amongst economic and political
liberalizations. Economic liberalizations are measured by a widely used indicator that captures the
scope of the market in the economy, and in particular of policies towards freer international trade
(cf. Sachs and Werner 1995, Wacziarg and Welch 2003). Political liberalizations correspond to the
event of becoming a democracy. Using a difference-in-difference estimation, we ask what are the
effects of liberalizations on economic performance, on macroeconomic policy and on structural
policies. The main results concern the quantitative relevance of the feedback and interaction effects
between the two kinds of reforms. First, we find positive feedback effects between economic and
political reforms. The timing of events indicates that causality is more likely to run from political
to economic liberalizations, rather than viceversa, but we cannot rule out feedback effects in both
directions. Second, the sequence of reforms matters. Countries that first liberalize and then become












1.  Introduction 
In an assessment of the recent research on the effects of institutions on growth, the IMF concludes: 
“While the association between institutional quality and economic performance appears strong and 
robust, much more unsettled is the question of what lies behind these findings. (WEO, April 2003, 
chapter 3)”. Contrasting the view that institutions are mainly determined by a country’s geography, 
that is by its location on the earth, or by its history, for instance by the origin of the Europeans who 
first settled in the country, the IMF further observes: “The evidence that greater openness to trade 
and stronger competition are conducive to institutional improvement, and thus to growth, suggests 
that countries are not ‘predestined’, say by geography or history: the ‘right’ policies may shape 
institutions and through this cannel affect growth.”  
But if economic liberalization affects growth and institutions, what determines a country’s 
decision to liberalize its economy? Economic liberalization, moreover, is just one dimension along 
which a country may open up, the other, and perhaps the most important one, being political 
liberalization, that is becoming a democracy. What are the relationships between these two forms of 
liberalization? Does one appear to “cause” the other? Do both affect growth and other economic 
policies? Are there positive interaction effects—that is, do the benefits from adopting economic and 
political liberalization exceed the individual effect that each of them would produce if adopted in 
isolation?  These are the questions motivating this paper.  
More precisely, the paper addresses four separate questions: (i) How do economic and 
political liberalizations affect economic outcomes such as growth and investment, macroeconomic 
policies, such as inflation and the budget surplus, and structural policies, such as indicators of 
protection of property rights and control of corruption ?  (ii) Does economic liberalization “induce” 
political liberalization, is the causality running the other way, or are the two forms of liberalization 
unrelated? (iii) How do economic and political liberalizations interact, that is are the effects of 
adopting both forms of liberalization greater than the sum of the individual effects of the two, when 
adopted in isolation? (iv) Does the ‘sequencing’ matter ? That is: if a country that was originally 
closed and non democratic decides to open up in both areas, does where it starts from make a 
difference?  
It is obviously not the first time these issues are addressed. Parts of the first question--the 
effects of economic and political liberalizations on growth and investment--have been addressed in 
the literature. Sachs and Werner (1995), and more recently Wacziarg and Welch (2003), have 
studied the effects of economic liberalization. A large literature, that includes Barro (1995), 
Prezworsky and Limongi (1993) and (2000), Roll and Talbott (2003) and Persson (2004) among 
others, has studied the economic effects of political liberalizations. However, with the exception of   3
Persson (2004), who focuses on the policy effects of different types of democratizations, economic 
and political liberalizations have been studied separately, thus missing the possibility that the two 
might interact. The main contribution of this paper is to study the interaction between the two types 
of liberalizations, focusing not only on the economic outcomes (growth and investment), but also on 
the effects on the quality of institutions that accompany or are induced by liberalizations. 
We address these questions using data from a sample of about 140 countries, over the period 
1960-2000. The variables we look at are the traditional ones considered in the literature on 
economic and political liberalizations, and are described in section 2. Our empirical methodology is 
adapted from the microeconometric literature on the effects of various treatments. Specifically, 
following Persson (2004), we estimate the effect of reforms using a difference-in-difference 
technique: this exploits both the cross country and the time series variation in the data, but with 
arguably weaker identifying assumptions than the typical exclusion restrictions employed by most 
of the macroeconomic literature on this topic. In this respect, our results provide new information 
even when we consider issues that have been studied before in the literature. The empirical 
methodology is illustrated in section 3.  
Our empirical results are described in section 4. We start by studying the effects of each 
liberalization separately. Here we confirm the finding that economic liberalization is good for 
growth and investment; but this effect cannot be entirely attributed to international trade: economic 
liberalizations tend to be accompanied or followed by a host of other policy improvements, 
including an improvement in the budget surplus, better protection of property rights and lower 
corruption. The main effect of a transition to democracy, on the other hand, is to improve the 
quality of institutions (protection of property rights and control of corruption), but to deteriorate the 
macroeconomic environment, with only small positive effects on economic growth.   
Studying the effects of each reform separately can be misleading, however, because it 
conceals possible feedback and interaction effects between the two kinds of reforms. The main 
results of this paper concern the quantitative relevance of these feedback and interaction effects. 
First, the data strongly suggest that indeed there are positive feedback effects between economic 
and political reforms. The timing of events indicates that causality is more likely to run from 
political to economic liberalizations, rather than viceversa: many economic liberalizations are 
preceded by political liberalizations, while the converse is observed less frequently--although we 
cannot rule out feedback effects in both directions.  Second, the data also suggest that there are 
interaction effects between the two kinds of reforms: countries that enact both reforms have better 
economic performance compared to countries that enact only one kind of reform, and the effects are 
not additive. More importantly, the sequencing of reforms matters. Countries that first liberalize and   4
then become democracies do much better than countries that pursue the opposite sequence. Section 
5 briefly discusses our interpretation of this finding.  
Thus, the main practical but tentative lesson of this paper can be summarized as follows. 
Consider a country that is closed both economically and politically, like China or Russia in the late 
1980s. This country can follow two paths to economic and political liberalism. The “easy path” is to 
do what Russia did: first become a democracy and then try open up the economy. This route is 
“easy” in the sense that democratic governments are more likely to pursue economic liberalizations 
compared to dictatorships. But the economic payoffs are much higher for countries that do it the 
“hard way”, namely who open up the economy while still being autocracies, and only then become 
democracies. In some sense, this is what China is trying to do. This route is harder in the sense that 
very few autocracies have pursued economic liberalizations; but those who did performed much 
better than the rest.  The comparison between China and Russia, of course, fits this lesson very well.    
 
2.  The data 
The sample consists of yearly data for about 140 advanced and developing countries included in the 
analysis of Persson (2004) and selected on the basis of data availability during the period 1960-
2000.    
  
2.1 Economic and political liberalizations 
Our indicator of economic liberalizations is taken from Wacziarg and Welch (2003), who in turn 
have updated the earlier indicators compiled by Sachs and Werner (1995).  A country is considered 
as closed to international trade if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) average tariffs 
exceed 40%; (ii) non-tariff barriers cover more than 40% of its imports; (iii) it has a socialist 
economic system; (iv) the black market premium on the exchange rate exceeds 20%; (v) much of its 
exports are controlled by a state monopoly. A country is open if none of these conditions applies.  
Throughout the paper we refer to an economic liberalization as the event of becoming open, given 
that a country was closed in the previous year.  Thus, this measure of economic liberalization seeks 
to capture discrete and comprehensive policy changes that increase the scope of the market in 
allocating goods and services. Freer international trade is an important component, though not the 
only one, of economic liberalizations as defined here. Since we are less interested in the specific 
problems raised by transitions away from a socialist economic system, throughout the analysis we 
control for formerly socialist countries, as described below. 
Sachs and Werner (1995) find that this indicator of openness is positively correlated with 
economic growth in the period 1970-89. The effect is very large and robust: economic liberalization   5
increases average growth by as much as 2%. Following Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) 
1, Wacziarg 
and Welch (2003) update the Sachs and Werner index of economic liberalizations for the 1990s. 
The cross-sectional correlations are weaker in the 1990s:  they find that an updated dummy for the 
1990s is conditionally uncorrelated with economic growth across countries, so that the results in 
SW appear to be specific to their chosen time period. However, using the country-specific dates of 
liberalization—the same we use in this paper--and studying the within-country effects of 
liberalization, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) confirm that episodes of ecnomic liberalizations are 
followed by an increased trade volume, faster growth and an acceleration of investment. The effects 
on trade are significant over the entire sample (1950-1998), though weaker in the most recent period 
(1990-1998). This last finding suggests that announced trade reforms are not always associated with 
increases in trade: this will happen if, for instance, tariffs are replaced by other trade barriers, as was 
the case in India in 2000-01. Why “liberalizations” as defined by the Wacziarg and Welch (2003)  
dummy may not be accompanied by increases in trade volumes is one of the facts addressed in this 
paper. 
Following Persson and Tabellini (2003), Persson (2004) and a large literature on the topic, we 
define a country as a democracy if it has strictly positive values of the indicator POLITY2 in the 
POLITY IV database
2.  Throughout this paper, we refer to a democratization as the event of 
becoming a democracy, given that a country was not a democracy the previous year.  The choice of 
0 as the dividing line between democratic and non democratic regimes is suggested by the 
observation that POLITY2 tends to jump discretely around zero. The standard deviation of this 
variable is 0.2 over the entire range (-10, +10 where the mean is 7.6) and 0.5 in the range (-3, +3 
where the mean is 1.7).  A cursory look at the time series data indicates that indeed crossing 0 is 
often associated with large and discrete improvements in institutions that take place over one or two 
years, while subsequent improvements in this indicator tend to be much more gradual. The same 
definition of democracy was used in previous studies, such as Persson and Tabellini (2003) and in 




                                                 
1 Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) point out that the Sachs and Werner (1995) definition of being closed is dominated by 
the last two conditions (state monopoly in exports and black market premia). But see the reply in Werner (2003). 
2 POLITY2 codes transition years by interpolating the variable POLITY from the years before to the years at the end of 
the transition. The variable POLITY in turn seeks to measure the quality of democratic institutions, on the basis of 
freedom of active and passive participation in elections, checks and balances on the executive, freedom of political 
association and respect of other basic political rights. It has been coded in the POLITY project 
(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm) precisely with the purpose of detecting changes in political 
institutions over time.     6
2.2 Performance measures 
We consider three types of indicators of performance: (i) general economic outcomes; (ii) 
macroeconomic policies; (iii) governance indicators.  
Our first and main question is whether economic and political liberalizations have an effect on 
general economic outcomes. Perhaps the ultimate indicator of economic performance is real per 
capita income, but for reasons that we discuss below, it is difficult to draw inferences about the 
causal effect of reforms on the level of income. Moreover, the time period we consider only lasts 40 
years, and many reforms take place in the second half of this period. Hence, rather than studying the 
effect of reforms on the level of per capita income, we focus on its growth rate, defined as the first 
difference of the log of GDP per capita (growth). In addition, we also consider the investment rate, 
defined as the ratio of total investment to GDP (investment), and in some cases we also look at a 
measure of the relative size of international trade, defined as import plus exports over GDP (trade). 
The source for these three variables are the Penn World tables. For most countries, these variables 
are available for the whole period 1960-2000. 
Our second question is whether economic and political liberalizations induce governments to 
choose (or are accompanied by) better macroeconomic policies.  As indicators of macroeconomic 
policy, we consider the yearly rate of inflation, expressed in logs (inflation), and the central 
government surplus as a fraction of GDP (surplus).  The source of these variables is the IMF. 
Inflation is available for the whole period for many countries, although for quite a few countries the 
series contains some non-contiguous years of missing observations. The variable surplus   is 
available from the early 1970s onwards only, and for a few countries for a shorter period.  
Finally, we ask whether economic and political liberalizations also induce governments to 
introduce new institutions or improve existing institutions, with the results of enhancing the 
protection of property rights or the protection from abuse by government. For this purpose, we 
include among our measures of performance two widely studied indicators of perception of good 
governance. The first, called gadp,  summarizes perceptions of structural policies and institutional 
environments encouraging the production of output rather than its diversion (through theft, 
corruption, litigation or expropriation).  This variable has been compiled by Knack and Keefer 
(1995) using ICRG data. It is available over the period 1982-97 and consists of a simple average of 
five indicators: two relate to the role of the government in protecting property rights against private 
diversion (law and order, and bureaucratic quality); the other three to the role of the government 
itself as a source of diversion (corruption, risk of expropriation and government repudiation of 
contracts). The variable gadp varies from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating better policies 
(more protection of property rights).  As we are particularly interested in the role of regime changes   7
in preventing abuse of power by government officials, we also consider one specific component of 
gadp, namely, perceptions of the control of corruption (corruption).  This indicator (unlike gadp) 
varies from 0 to 6, again with higher values denoting better policies – i.e. less corruption.  This 
variable too is only available from 1982 -1997, and its source is the same as for gadp.   
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 General econometric strategy  
How can we estimate the causal effect of economic and political reforms on economic 
performance? Most existing macroeconomic literature has focused on one of two approaches. The 
simplest one is to estimate cross country regressions. Economic performance, or economic policies, 
are regressed on indicators of the political or trade regime.
3 The obvious problem here is that the 
estimated correlation could reflect an omitted variable or reverse causation. The typical solution is 
to find an instrument for the political or trade regime, as in Hall and Jones (1999). But good 
instruments are not easily available, particularly when it comes to democracy. Moreover, as 
discussed in Wacziarg and Welch (2003), cross-sectional regressions mask useful information from 
the time variation in the data. The second approach is to estimate panel regressions. 
4  While 
exploiting also the time variation in the data, this approach too relies on restrictive and untestable 
identifying assumptions taking the form of exclusion restrictions.  
  In this paper, we follow the microeconometric approach. We define reforms as a “treatment” 
administered to some countries but not others, and estimate the causal effect of the treatment 
through a difference-in-difference estimation. This methodology, used in this context also by 
Persson (2004), allows us to exploit both the time series and the cross sectional variation in the 
data.
5  Specifically, we include in the analysis as many countries as possible: some experienced a 
reform during the period of observation, and are called “treated”; others had no reform during this 
period, and are called “controls”. For instance, when studying the effect of economic liberalizations, 
the control countries are those that were always open or always closed during the relevant time 
period.  We then compare economic performance in the treated countries, before and after the 
treatment, with the economic performance of the control group over the same time period. The 
estimation method thus exploits both the within-country variation as well as the comparison 
between countries. This has clear advantages relative to the simpler comparisons in isolation: 
                                                 
3 Examples of this approach are Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004) on the effects of democracy, Alesina, Spolaore 
and Wacziarg (2003) on the effect on trade volumes.  
4 Examples of this approach are Sachs and Werner (1995) on economic liberalizations, Barro (1996) or Prezworski and 
Limongi (1993) on democracy. 
5 In this respect, our methodology differs from both Wacziarg and Welch (2003) and Roll and Talbott (2003), who 
estimate the effect of  economic and political liberalizations, respectively, only from within-country (i.e. before-after) 
comparisons.     8
exploiting the within-country variation only, risks confounding the effect of a treatment with that of 
unobserved variables that move all countries at the same time--a relevant possibility in our context 
because many economic and political liberalizations are clustered in the 1990s. Exploiting the 
cross-sectional comparisons only, can be even more misleading, because the omitted variable 
problem is daunting in this context.    
 Since reforms do not take place in all countries at the same time, to implement the 
difference-in-difference approach we estimate the following regressions in the whole sample of 
treated and control countries, where i subscripts refer to countries and t subscripts refer to years:  
 
(1)                              yit = ai  +  bt  + γ xit + δ reformit + eit 
 
where  yit   denotes the measure of performance, a  and b are country and year fixed effects 
respectively, xit  is a set of other control variables, reformit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 
in the years after the reform in the treated countries and 0 otherwise (i.e , in the treated countries 
before the reform and in the control countries) and e is an unobserved error term. The coefficient δ  
measures the effect of the reform on the variable of interest y.   
 
3.2 Identification 
As explained for instance in Besley and Case (2000) or in Blundell and McCurdy (2000), the 
crucial identifying assumption in this difference-in-difference estimation is that there is no 
unobserved variable affecting performance that moves systematically over time in a different way 
between the treated and control groups. A violation of this assumption is more likely if the treated 
and control countries are very different from each other, because in this case any omitted time-
varying variable, such as technological progress or increased globalization, could affect treated and 
control countries in very different ways.  The identifying assumption could also be violated if 
reforms are not random and whatever triggers the reform also has a causal effect on performance; 
for instance, economic liberalizations might be systematically enacted by far sighted political 
leaders, who also promote sound economic performance in many other ways. 
  Both identifying assumptions are clearly restrictive, as is always the case in 
macroeconomics.  Nevertheless, there are a number of steps we can take to reduce the likelihood of 
violation and to check their validity.  First, by including in the control groups countries that are 
always open or always closed economically, or always democratic or non-democratic, we insure 
that the average control country is not very different from the average treated country. 
6  Second, we 
                                                 
6 To check this, we have estimated the probability of treatment (i.e. of undergoing economic or political liberalizations) 
as a function of some time invariant country features, namely continental location (being in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America) and socialist legal origin. Figure A1 in the appendix displays the histograms of the estimated probability of   9
always include in the vector x of additional controls a dummy variable for socialist legal origin 
interacted with the economic or political reform that we are studying. This makes sure that the 
estimated effects of reforms do not reflect the very special circumstances of the transition in 
formerly socialist countries. Moreover, we also always check that the results are robust to including 
in the vector x of additional controls the interaction between year fixed effects and time invariant 
variables that classify countries according to their continent (Africa, Latin America and Asia) and to 
socialist legal origin. Conditioning on this time varying variable makes countries more similar and 
thus reduces the likelihood of a violation of our identifying assumption – see also footnote 6 and 
Figure A1. Third, we check the estimated residuals of the control group (over the whole period) and 
of the treated group before the reform; a violation of the assumption that reforms are random is 
likely to result in systematically different time patterns of the estimated residuals between these two 
groups of countries. If we do not find clearly different patterns over time, we are reassured about 
the validity of our identifying assumption.   
 
 3.3 Implementation 
Implementing this estimation strategy in our context requires addressing a few other problems.  
First, some reforms take place very close to the end of the sample for which we have available 
measures of performance. Since we expect that it takes some time for reforms to influence 
performance, we discard the reforms that took place in the last three years of the available sample. 
Specifically, we set to missing the observations of the dependent variables after a reform, if the 
reform is not followed by at least three additional years of data on performance. For instance, 
Burkina Faso liberalized its economy in 1998 and growth is only available until 2000. We have thus 
set growth to missing for Burkina Faso from 1998 onwards, and this country is thus considered a 
control (since  it did not experience any liberalization before 1998).  Since the pattern of available 
data differs depending on the measures of performance, this also implies that the groups of control 
and treated countries vary with our definition of performance.  With regard to the beginning of the 
sample, we only require one available observation of performance before the reform took place, for 
a country to be classified as treated (since here delayed effects are not a problem).  
 Second, in a few countries we observe episodes of reversals in economic and political 
liberalizations.  Reversals are more frequent for democratizations, particularly in a few African 
                                                                                                                                                                  
treatment (i.e. of having at least one reform) for different groups of countries: those who had no reforms, those who had 
only one reform, and those who had both. We find controls and treated countries close to both extremes of the estimated 
probabilities of treatment (the so called “propensity score”); that is we find a few control countries that were likely to 
experience some reforms but did not, such as Haiti, as well as several treated countries that were not very likely to 
receive treatment, such as Ireland with regard to economic liberalization, or Iran towards the end of the sample with 
regard to political liberalization. This reassures us that the two groups of countries are not too different from each other.    10
countries that start out as democracies upon becoming independent and then, after a few years, 
collapse into dictatorships. Some of these episodes of reversals or of democratization are very brief 
and last only a few years. To cope with this problem, we define treatment in two different ways. 
First, we only consider permanent reforms, that is uninterrupted reforms that are not reversed in the 
sample up to the year 2000.   In this case we ignore temporary reforms that are subsequently 
reversed. The reason for doing this is that reversed liberalizations are in some sense incomplete 
reforms that failed in some important yet unobserved dimension. Here we are interested in the 
effects of the reforms that lasted. Of course, this might create a selection problem for the reforms 
that happen towards the end of the sample, for which a reversal might take place in the future but 
cannot be observed.   Next, we define the treatment to include all reform episodes that last at least 
four years, irrespective of whether they are temporary or permanent. The restriction to at least four 
years of reform is imposed in light of the observation that the effects of the reform on performance 
do not occur suddenly.
7    
Last, some of our measures of performance, such as the rate of investment or corruption, 
move slowly over time. Despite the inclusion of year dummy variables, the residuals of our 
regressions for these measures of performance are likely to be serially correlated. Although this 
does not bias the estimated treatment effect, it could lead us to underestimate the true standard 
errors (see Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). To cope with this problem, we always report 
also standard errors estimated with clustered regressions, that allow residuals to be correlated within 
each country block. In some specifications we also control for lagged per capita income or the 
lagged dependent variable, or we estimate by averaging the data over longer periods. We discuss 
these specification and estimation issues more in detail in the next section.  
Finally, Table 1 lists the sample of countries for which we have data on growth and on at least 
one of the reform indicators (democracy, and being economically open or closed). The table is split 
in three panels: panel A lists the control countries (those that were always open or always closed 
during the period in which data on growth are available); panel B lists the treated countries that had 
only one reform during the period in which data on growth are available--either political or 
economic liberalization; panel C lists all treated countries that experienced both reforms during the 
relevant time period. In each panel, the second and third columns report the date of their last 
                                                 
7 In a few countries, reforms are enacted, then are interrupted for just a few years, and then are enacted again. If the 
reversal lasts three years or less, we neglect it and when coding all reform years (permanent and temporary) we code the 
reversal period as if it did not occur. Again, this is suggested by the logic that reforms (and reversals) need to last some 
time to show their effects. For instance, Albania became a democracy with available data on growth in 1992, and 
remained a democracy until the end, except for a one-year, 1996, during which democracy was interrupted. When we 
define treatment as a permanent reform, we code the treatment as having started in 1997 (the year of permanent 
democratization). When we consider all instances of democratization, we neglect the reversal of 1996 that lasted only 
one year, and we classify Albania as a democracy throughout this period (and hence we consider it a control country).        11
liberalization and of their last democratization (i.e. a permanent liberalization or democratization as 
defined above). A missing date means that no change in the relevant dimension was observed 
during this period.
8 About 85 countries had at least one episode of trade liberalization during 1960-
2000 that was not subsequently reversed, while there are about 50 countries that have become 




First we study the effects of liberalizations and of democratizations in isolation. Then we study the 
feedbacks and the interactions between the two types of reform.  
4.1  The effects of economic liberalizations 
Table 2 reports the effects of economic liberalization on growth an investment. The control group 
consists of all the countries that, in our sample, did not go through a regime change as far as 
economic liberalization is concerned: that is, as explained in the previous section, the controls are 
the countries that remained either always closed or always open throughout the sample--or, more 
precisely, in the portion of our sample for which the dependent variable exists, here growth and 
investment.  
Table 2 should be read as follows (the same holds for Tables 3 through 7).  The variable lib is 
a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-liberalization years for the treated countries only. Its 
estimated coefficient captures the average effect of the reform. The first columns, labelled 
“permanent” in the fourth-but-last row, only consider permanent liberalizations, that is 
liberalizations that last until the end of our sample. The columns labelled “all” consider instead all 
liberalization episodes, including those that were eventually reversed, provided they last longer than 
3 years. For each regression we report two standard errors, those from the OLS regression (above) 
and those for the clustered regressions (below). As explained in the previous section, all regressions 
include country fixed effects and year dummy variables, as well as the dummy variable for socialist 
legal origin interacted with the reform dummy variable. In columns 2 and 5, as well as columns 7 
and 10, we also control for year dummy variables interacted with dummy variables for continental 
location (Africa, Asia and Latina America) and for socialist legal origin.  
Table 2 shows that economic liberalizations speed up growth by about 1% and raise the share 
of investment by almost 2% of GDP. The effects of permanent and temporary liberalizations are not 
very different—if anything, temporary liberalizations seem to have a larger effect on growth and 
investment than those that are not reversed. These estimates are similar to those obtained by 
                                                 
8 For a few countries only, a missing observation means that the economic or political regime could not be classified 
based on available data.   12
Wacziarg and Welch (2003), who only consider treated countries and compare the periods before 
and after the reform. 
Columns 3 and 8 investigate the timing of these effects, by replacing the variable lib with a 
dummy variable equal to 1 in the three years preceding the reform (3y_pre_lib), a dummy variable 
equal to 1 in the year of the reform and in the three following years (3y_post_lib), and a dummy 
variable equal to 1 from year 4 after the reform and onwards (4yon_post_lib). Liberalizations seem 
to be triggered by crisis: they occur at the end of a period during which the economy grows less 
than usual (about 1 percent below trend growth), and investment is unusually low. Moreover, the 
positive effects of liberalization take at least 4 years to show up. Note that the estimated coefficient 
of the variable (4yon_post_lib) captures the difference between average economic performance four 
years after the reform and the default years (i.e. the control countries and the treated countries in the 
years that precede the reform by more than three years). Thus, after four years or more, not only is 
the crisis overcome, but economic performance is significantly better than before the crisis.  
If reforms are preceded by a crisis, is our identification assumption at risk? Not necessarily, 
unless one believes that something else happened during or after the crisis (other than the economic 
reform itself), which in turn is responsible for the observed improvement in economic performance 
four years or more down the line.   On the contrary, this time pattern suggests that the improvement 
in economic performance certainly did not start before the reform was implemented, and thus if 
anything it reinforces a causal interpretation of the estimates.  We return to a discussion of the 
identifying assumptions in subsection 4.3 below. 
The finding that reforms are preceded by crisis raises yet another concern: could the growth 
and investment acceleration after the reform simply reflect economic convergence once the crisis is 
overcome?  To answer this question we re-estimated the equation including lagged per-capita 
income among the regressors. If the growth or investment acceleration four years after the reform 
was just due to the income loss suffered during the crisis years, it would be captured by this new 
variable. To avoid the bias due to the inclusion of lagged per-capita income in a panel regression 
with country fixed effects, we discarded all countries for which less than 21 years of data are 
available – this left us with 100 countries and an average panel length of about 30 years per country. 
The estimated effect of liberalization on growth and investment was very similar to that reported in 
Table 2, for  all specifications. 
As a final check against spurious dynamic effects, we also re-estimated the model with a two-
step procedure suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) to cope with serially 
correlated residuals. First, we estimated the residuals of a panel regression of economic 
performance (growth or investment) against country and year fixed effects (in some specifications   13
we also included year dummy variables interacted with continental location and socialist legal 
origin), for the whole sample of countries (treated and controls). Then we retained only the treated 
countries and computed the average of the residuals before and after the last unreversed reform. To 
have a long enough time average, we discarded the spells (before or after the reform) that lasted less 
than 10 years. Under the null hypothesis that economic liberalizations have no effect on economic 
performance, the averaged residuals should be the same before and after the reform. We could 
always reject this null hypothesis, finding that economic liberalizations improve economic 
performance.  
Table 3 documents the effect of economic liberalization on gadp and corruption. Remember 
that  gadp is an index ranging between 0 and 10, while corruption ranges between 0 and 6. 
Liberalizations appear to be associated with improvements in the quality of these structural policies. 
The estimated effect is generally significant, particularly for gadp, but it is relatively small, never 
exceeding 0.6. Again, we find that the effects are delayed by at least 3 years. But since the 
dependent variables measure perceptions of good policies, these delayed effects cannot be 
interpreted as causal. Rather, a more natural interpretation is that economic liberalizations are 
simultaneously  accompanied by improvement in structural policies, and the perceptions improve a 
few years after new and better structural policies are in place. These episodes of economic reforms 
probably correspond to the implementation of a cluster of good policies, of which opening up to 
international trade is but one aspect.  
This general interpretation is also suggested by the estimates in Table 4, that look at the 
effects of economic liberalizations on macro policies. Following an economic liberalization the 
budget surplus improves by some 1.5 per cent of GDP - - here too the effects seem somewhat 
delayed. Inflation however, does not appear to be affected by economic liberalizations, although 
these tend to happen at the end of a period during which inflation was unusually high.
9 
We further discuss our identifying assumptions in section 4.3 below. But before doing that, 
we study the effects of political reforms.  
 
4.2  The effects of democratizations  
Tables 5-7 repeat the analysis for the same dependent variables and with exactly the same structure, 
but defining the reform as the event of becoming a democracy. Here the control group includes all 
the countries that were either always democratic or always non-democratic.  
                                                 
9 In Tables 3 and 4 we generally do not have a long enough time period to estimate dynamic equations with lagged 
dependent variables or with the two-step procedure suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004).  The only 
exception is inflation, for which we have 91 countries with 21 years of data or more. Including a lagged dependent 
variable and estimating the effect of liberalization on inflation yields a negative and significant estimated coefficient, 
suggesting that inflation goes down after economic liberalization.    14
In Tables 5 the dependent variables are growth and the investment rate. Democratic 
transitions are associated with small improvements in economic performance. The effects are 
generally too small to be statistically significant, however, except when we consider all political 
reforms (rather than permanent reforms only) – cf. columns 4, 5 and 9.  Columns 3 and 8 study the 
timing of these effects. As for economic liberalization, the event of becoming a democracy is 
preceded by a slowdown in growth and investment--though the estimated coefficients are not 
statistically significant. The results are very similar if we include lagged per-capita income among 
the regressors (disregarding the countries for which less than 21 years of data are available): the 
estimated effect of becoming a democracy is positive and about the same order of magnitude as in 
Table 5, but it is statistically significant only when considering all democratizations. The two step 
procedure described above and suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) yields 
statistically insignificant estimates.  
Overall, these estimates tend to confirm previous results in the literature, that found no robust 
effect of becoming a democracy on economic performance, although they point to small positive 
effects of democratizations, leaving some room for an optimistic assessment about the effects of 
becoming a democracy. 
Tables 6 shows that political liberalizations, improve gadp and corruption with a lag, though 
again by relatively small amounts. The effects on corruption are typically stronger than those for 
gadp.  The order of magnitude is about the same as for economic liberalizations.   
Finally, Table 7 shows that democratizations are associated with ambiguous effects on 
macroeconomic policy: inflation rises but so does the budget surplus.  The timing of these effects, 
illustrated in columns 3 and 8, is puzzling however: both inflation and the budget surplus are 
already higher up to three years before democratization, relative to the default observations. This 
suggests that the identifying assumption might be violated, since the policy changes might precede 
the political reform.
10    
 
4.3 Discussion  
The results up to this point can be summarized as follows. Economic liberalization is good along all 
dimensions: it is accompanied by better structural policies and better macroeconomic policies, and 
it is followed by improved economic performance. This timing suggests a causal interpretation, at 
least with regard to economic outcomes. Political liberalization, on the contrary, do not have strong 
and robust effects on growth and investment, though they appear to improve structural policies and 
                                                 
10 Adding a lagged dependent variable to the inflation regressions, or estimating with the two step procedure discussed 
above, yields small positive coefficients of democratization on inflation, which are significant in some but not all 
specifications.   15
they yield mixed results on macroeconomic policies.  These findings confirm with a new 
methodology previous results in the literature about the effects of economic and political 
liberalizations on growth and investment, and add some new insights on other policy variables.   
As anticipated in section 3, the identifying assumption behind these estimates is that there is 
no unobserved time varying variable that affects performance in the treated and control groups 
differently. To check that this assumption is not clearly inconsistent with the data, Figures 1 and 2 
plot the average estimated residuals in each year, for the control group and for the treated group 
before the corresponding reform (permanent liberalization in Figure 1, permanent democratization 
in Figure 2).
11 The specification is the more comprehensive one, inclusive also of year fixed effects 
interacted with continental location and socialist legal origin. Under the identifying assumption, the 
residuals for these two groups of countries ought to be similar, up until the time of the reform. But 
this is not what we find. Only in one case (the growth regression when the treatment is economic 
liberalization) the two groups of countries exhibit very similar time patterns. In all other cases the 
dependent variable for the group of treated countries before the ‘treatment’ appears to behave 
somewhat differently from that for the control group. The difference is particularly pronounced 
towards the end of the sample, when the number of treated countries becomes very small because 
more and more countries have taken the treatment.  
These figures suggest two possible sources of bias in these ‘single treatment’ regressions. The 
‘treatment’, that is economic or political liberalization, did not happen randomly, but at the end of a 
period during which a country that eventually opened up, along one or the other dimension, 
behaved in a systematically different way from the control group—for instance was investing more, 
or less, than the controls. If the reform does not happen randomly, then our results could be affected 
by a selection bias—for instance we could find larger investment after economic liberalizations 
simply because the countries that opened up were already investing more than the group of control 
countries. Alternatively, the bias could be the result of having omitted one or more variables 
correlated with both performance and treatment. This second problem is particularly relevant if both 
reforms tend to be undertaken simultaneously, or if one type of reform induces the other.  If so, 
omitting one of the two treatment variables biases the estimated effect of the included one—for 
instance we may attribute an improvement in gadp to economic liberalization, while it is really the 
effect of the transition to a democratic regime which accompanies economic liberalization. 
                                                 
11 In interpreting these figures, one should bear in mind that the treated and control groups vary in each diagram, and 
that the treatment date is different for different countries. Moreover, as time progresses, the group of treated countries 
becomes smaller (because more and more countries have taken the treatment), while the size of the control group in 
each diagram remains constant over time. For each dependent variable, the residuals in Figure 1 are estimated from the 
second column in each of the panels in Tables 2-4, while the residuals in Figure 2 are estimated from the second column 
in each of the panels in Tables 5-7.   16
Motivated by these concerns, we now consider the feedback effects between economic and 
political liberalizations, as well as possible interactions in their effects on the performance 
indicators.  
 
4.4  Effects of economic liberalizations on democracy, and viceversa 
We start by studying the feedback effects between economic and political liberalizations. That is, 
we first ask whether one reform appears to ‘cause’ the other.  
A priori, the feedback effects could go in both directions and are likely to reinforce each 
other. Trade tends to benefit many, and hurt a few: it thus seems more likely that a democratic 
regime shifts the balance in favour of freer trade. It is also possible, however, that a liberalized 
economic regime fosters a transition towards democracy, for instance because it increases the 
economic well being and the economic power of the middle classes (see for instance Acemoglou 
and Robinson, 2004 and Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
The results are displayed in Table 8. Here the dependent variables are, respectively, the 
continuous variable POLITY2, that varies from -10 to +10 and measures the democratic quality of 
the political regime (higher values being better democracies), and the 0-1 index of economic 
liberalization. In the regression in which the dependent variable is the quality of democracy, the 
treatment is defined as the economic reform and  the control group includes all the countries that 
never changed their economic regime. Viceversa, when the dependent variable is being 
economically open, the treatment is democratization and the control groups consists of all countries 
that never changed their political regime.
12   
The first lesson from Table 8 is that feedback effects are generally important. The estimated 
coefficients are often positive and significant both when we ask whether economic liberalization 
affects political liberalization, or the other way around. Investigating the effects of these two 
reforms in isolation, as commonly done in the literature, may thus result in biased estimates of their 
effects.  
The timing of these feedback effects is very different for the two reforms, however, and 
suggests that causality is more likely to run from political to economic liberalizations rather than 
viceversa. Economic liberalizations (the left-hand-side panel of Table 8) do not appear to lead the 
transition to a democracy: as shown in columns 3 and 5, the quality of democracy is higher both 
before and after the date of economic liberalization. In particular, there is no evidence that 
POLITY2 is higher in the years following economic liberalization, compared to the 5 preceding 
                                                 
12 In columns 6-8, where we consider the effects of permanent democratizations, the dependent variable is defined as 
being permanently open ; in columns 9 and 10, where we consider the effect all democratizations (permanent and 
temporary), the dependent variable is being open (irrespective of whether or not there has been a reversal).   17
years. Note  that this result is obtained both for permanent democratizations (column 3) as well as 
for temporary ones (column 5). 
Democratizations, on the contrary, appear to lead economic liberalization (see the right-hand-
side panel of Table 8). The index of economic liberalization rises over time in the years following 
the transition to a democratic regime, thus suggesting that political liberalization ‘induces’ 
economic liberalizations much more than the other way around.  Since the dependent variable here 
is either 0 or 1, the coefficients in the right hand panel of Table 8 can be interpreted as effects on 
probabilities—that is, for instance, the coefficient 0.32 in column 8 means that over 4 years after the 
transition to a democracy the probability that a country will open up has increased by 32 per cent – 
a large effect indeed. 
A cursory look at the data in Table 1 also suggests that the direction of causality is more 
likely to go from political to economic liberalizations rather than viceversa. As shown in panel C of 
Table 1, among the countries that undertook both reforms in the period 1960-2000, as many as 23 
countries first became democracies and then opened up the economy, while the opposite sequence 
is observed in only 9 countries. Moreover, countries that first became democracies opened up the 
economy after about 4 years on average, while for the opposite sequence the average distance 
between the two reforms exceeds 9 years, suggesting that these two reforms are less closely related 
in this second group of countries.  
Despite these remarks, other features of the data suggest that the feedback effects could go in 
both directions. Figure 3 displays the estimated residuals for the control countries and for the treated 
countries before the reform. In the top panel, the dependent variable is economic liberalization, and 
the treatment is becoming a (permanent) democracy; in the bottom panel, the dependent variable is 
the quality of democracy as measured by POLITY2, and the treatment is (permanent) economic 
liberalization.
13 If the direction of causality ran exclusively from democracy to economic 
liberalization, in the top panel the residuals for the control countries and the treated countries before 
the political reform should display similar patterns. But this is not what we find. In particular, with 
reference to the upper panel of Figure 3, where the dependent variable is economic liberalization, 
the residuals from the treated group before political reform display a positive trend towards the end 
of the 1990s. This suggests that this group of countries was more likely to open up in the 1990s, 
quite independently of the prior transition to a democracy. Indeed, most cases of economic 
liberalization that are preceded by political liberalization happen in the 1990’s; when we exclude 
this decade from the sample the estimated coefficients in Table 8 drop and become negative or 
                                                 
13 Here too, as in the previous figures, the specification includes also year fixed effects interacted with dummy variables 
for continental location and for socialist legal origin. For each dependent variable the residuals are thus estimated from 
the second column in each of the panels in Table 8.   18
statistically insignificant, and the evidence of a ‘causal’ link between the two forms of 
liberalizations disappears.  
Overall, we are thus led to conclude that the positive feedback between economic and 
political liberalizations could run in both directions, and that it is difficult to ascertain a precise 
direction of causality between economic and political reforms. This suggests that we ought to study 
the effects of the two liberalizations jointly; this is what we do in the next section. 
 
4.5   Interactions between political and economic liberalizations 
The control group now consists of all countries that have never changed either political or economic 
regime, and we allow for multiple treatments: only economic liberalization, only democratization, 
or both.  
The question of whether there are complementarities or other interactions between different 
types of reforms is of independent interest, beyond addressing the identification problem discussed 
in the previous section. We would like to know if the joint adoption of both reforms enhances the 
sum of the individual effects, and if the sequence of reforms matters. But there is also a more 
technical reason for allowing the estimated coefficients to differ depending on the number and 
sequence of reforms. If we imposed a priori the same coefficients on the reform dummy variables 
for all countries irrespective of the number and sequence of reforms--while the true effects are 
heterogeneous--the error term would pick up part of the heterogeneous treatment effect; with 
multiple treatments (and hence multiple dummy variables for economic reform in the same 
country), this would create a correlation between the error term and the reform dummy variables in 
the countries that experienced both treatments, leading to biased estimates.   
For these reasons, in this subsection we partition the countries in mutually exclusive groups 
and we estimate a specification that includes the following dummy variables for reforms:  
-  two dummy variables equal to one after political (economic) liberalization in the 
countries that only changed their political (economic) regime, leaving the other unchanged 
throughout the sample. These variable are labelled dem_1t, for democratization-1-treatment-only, 
(lib_1t, for liberalization -1-treatment-only).  
-  two dummy variables equal to one after political (economic) liberalization in the 
countries that enacted both reforms, that is liberalized the economy and also introduced democratic 
institutions. These variable are labelled dem_2t, for democratization-2-treatments, (lib_2t, for 
liberalization -2-treatments).   
-  two dummy variables equal to one after the second reform only, depending on the 
sequence of the reform. The variable  lib_after_dem is equal to one after the second reform only,   19
and only for countries that first became a democracy and then liberalized the economy; it is zero in 
all other cases. Likewise, the variable  dem_after_lib, is equal to one after the second reform for 
countries that first liberalized the economy and then became a democracy, otherwise it is zero. If the 
estimated coefficients of both variables are zero, then it means that there are no interaction effects 
(i.e. the effect of reforms as captured by the dummy variables dem_2t and lib_2t  are additive), and 
sequencing does not matter.
14    
Thus, the effect of reforms in countries that undertook both reforms should be read as follows. 
Consider a country like Mexico, that first opened up the economy and then became a democracy. 
When it liberalizes the economy, the effect on economic performance is given by the estimated 
coefficient of the variable lib_2t. When it then becomes a democracy, the effect is captured by the 
algebraic sum of the coefficients of dem_2t and dem_after_lib. Conversely, consider a country like 
Argentina, that followed the opposite sequence: first it became a democracy and then it opened up 
the economy. The effect of the first (political) reform is captured by the estimated coefficient of the 
variable dem_2t. The effect of the second (economic) reform, instead, is captured by the algebraic 
sum of the coefficients of lib_2t and lib_after_dem. 
As in the previous subsections, we always include a dummy variable for socialist legal origin 
interacted with a dummy variable for political liberalization and with a dummy variable for 
economic liberalization, to isolate the effects that are due to the special case of transition 
economies.  Given that here we seek to extract more information from the data, we pay more 
attention to the other conditioning variables; in particular, we always include year dummy variables 
interacted with dummy variables for continental location and socialist legal origin. We also report 
the estimates for a variety of alternative specifications and estimation methods.   
Figure 4 illustrates the estimated residuals in the usual way, for the control countries and for 
the treated countries before the first (permanent) reform.
15 With this richer specification and this 
definition of multiple treatments, the control and the treated groups now display a very similar 
behaviour, confirming that here the identifying assumption seems consistent with the data. 
Consider Table 9 first, where the dependent variables are growth and the investment rate. The 
first two columns of each panel (columns 1-2 and 6-7) report our basic estimates for permanent and 
all reforms respectively. Columns 3-4 and 8-9 add lagged income (also for permanent and all 
reforms respectively), to control for possible convergence dynamics; to reduce the impact of the 
lagged dependent variable bias in fixed effects estimation, here we discard all countries with less 
                                                 
14 One country, Paraguay, undertook both reforms in the same year; we thus set both variables, lib_after_dem and 
dem_after_lib, equal to 1 after both reforms for Paraguay.  
15 For each dependent variable, the residuals are estimated from the first column in each of the panels in Tables 9-11.   20
than 21 years of data. Since serial correlation in the residuals is less likely to be a problem in these 
regressions, we only report standard errors estimated by OLS.  
In the first two rows we report the estimated coefficients of the variables dem_1t and lib_1t, 
referring to the countries that opened up in only one dimension.  Here we see that becoming a 
democracy either has no effect on economic performance, or if anything it has a negative effect. 
Economic liberalization instead has a positive effect on economic performance, except in columns 1 
and 3 where we confine attention to growth and to permanent reforms and where the effect is 
insignificant. These estimates thus roughly confirm the findings already discussed in the previous 
subsections, when considering each reform in isolation, although the effects here are generally 
weaker.  
In rows three and four we report the estimated coefficients of the variables dem_2t and lib_2t, 
referring to the countries that undertook both reforms. As explained above, these coefficients 
capture the effect of the reform that came first (democracy or economic liberalization, depending on 
the sequence).  Once more, economic liberalization has strong positive effects on growth and (when 
all reforms are included) on investment. Becoming a democracy has no effects on investment, but 
leads to growth accelerations.  Compared to the countries that opened up in only one dimension, the 
effects here are generally stronger and more likely to be positive, particularly for democracy.   
Compared to the results described in the previous section where we considered each reform in 
isolation, we confirm that economic liberalizations induce economic improvements, but we now 
find stronger positive effects from becoming a democracy.  
Finally, rows six and seven report the estimated coefficients of the variables lib_after_dem 
and dem_after_lib. As explained above, these variables capture possible interaction effects between 
the two reforms and discriminate among countries on the basis of the sequencing. These estimated 
coefficients are generally different from zero, suggesting the presence of interaction effects, 
although with opposite signs on growth and investment.   
The overall effect of the last reform (democracy or economic liberalization, depending on the 
sequence) can be obtained by the algebraic sum of the estimated coefficient of dem_2t and 
dem_after_lib (if the sequence was first economic liberalization and then democracy), or by the sum 
of lib_2t and lib_after_dem (under the reverse sequence).  These algebraic sums indicate that, when 
the second reform is enacted, investment accelerates further while growth is not affected or might 
even fall. But here the effects are stronger for democracy than for economic liberalization. When 
the second reform is democracy, growth is not affected but investment accelerates by 2-3% of GDP, 
depending on the specification. When instead the second reform is liberalization, growth either falls 
or remains unaffected and investment rises but by less (about 1.5% of GDP).    21
Thus, the central new lesson from Table 9 is that the sequence of reforms matters a lot. 
Opening up the economy first and then becoming a democracy gives better results than the opposite 
sequence. This can be seen directly by comparing the estimated coefficients of lib_after_dem and 
dem_after_lib.  In the growth regressions, the estimated coefficient of lib_after_dem is always 
negative and significant, while the estimated coefficient of dem_after_lib, is not significantly 
different from zero (and sometimes it is even positive). In the investment regressions, the estimated 
coefficient of dem_after_lib is always positive and statistically significant, while the estimated 
coefficient of lib_after_dem is generally not significant and sometimes it is even negative. Thus, 
although the sign of the interaction effects is different on growth vs investment, both regressions 
imply that countries that open up the economy first perform better compared to countries that enact 
the opposite sequence. Opening up the economy first gives two boosts to economic performance: 
the first one at the time of economic liberalization; and then a second one, on investment, when the 
country becomes a democracy. Becoming a democracy first, instead, gives more disappointing 
results: there is some acceleration of growth (but not of investment) at the time of democratization; 
but later on, when the economy is liberalized, the positive effects of liberalizations tend to vanish or 
are smaller compared to the countries that enacted the two reforms in reverse order.   
As a final robustness check, columns 5 and 10 of Table 9 report the two step estimates 
obtained with the procedure suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) and described 
above. First we estimate the residuals of a panel regression of economic performance (growth or 
investment) against country and years fixed effects and the year dummy variables interacted with 
continental location and socialist legal origin, for the whole sample of countries (treated and 
controls). Then we retained only the treated countries and computed the country average of the 
residuals under three sub-periods: before any reform, after the first reform and before the second 
reform, and after the second reform (whenever it took place).
16 To have a long enough time 
average, we discarded the sub-periods lasting less than 10 years; we were left with 110 observations 
corresponding to an unbalanced panel of at most three periods for the treated countries. We then 
regressed theses remaining averaged estimated residuals on the same set of dummy variables used 
on yearly data and described above.
17 As shown in columns 5 and 10, the resulting estimates 
confirm the importance of the sequence of reforms.   
Table 10 reports the same set of estimates for two other dependent variables: international 
trade (defined as the volume of trade in percent of GDP) and the rate of inflation. The structure of 
Table 10 and the estimation procedures are identical to those of Table 9, except that in columns 3-4 
                                                 
16 Here we always refer to permanent (i.e. unreversed) reforms.  
17 As for the yearly data, in this second step we also controlled for socialist legal origin interacted with the political and 
economic reforms.    22
and 8-9 we now include the lagged dependent variable (rather than lagged per-capita income); thus, 
the estimated coefficients in these columns capture the short run effects of the reforms.  
The left hand panel of Table 10, on international trade, helps to understand why the sequence 
might be important.  Under the “good” sequence, economic liberalization gives a big boost to trade 
(the estimated coefficient of lib_2t is always positive and generally highly significant), with a 
second smaller boost once the country becomes a democracy (the algebraic sum of dem_2t and 
dem_after_lib is positive and significant in the first two columns).  Under the “bad” sequence, 
becoming a democracy reduces, if anything, trade volumes (the estimated coefficient of dem_2t is 
often negative and generally insignificant), and economic liberalization has negligible effects on 
trade (the algebraic sum of lib_2t and lib_after_dem is close to zero). The right hand panel of Table 
10, on inflation, suggests a second way in which the sequence seems to matter. Repeating the same 
steps, we see that economic liberalizations induce a fall in inflation in the countries that open up the 
economy first, but this does not happen if economic liberalizations follow democratizations.  Table 
10 thus suggest that there are two types of economic liberalizations: those that are associated with 
improvements in trade and better macroeconomic policy, and those that are not. Economic 
liberalizations that are enacted after a country has become a democracy are less effective at 
boosting trade volume and are accompanied by worse macroeconomic policies. This might be one 
channel through which the sequence of reforms matters. 
Table 11 repeats the analysis for the budget surplus and structural policies (gadp and 
corruption). Since a shorter time series is available for these dependent variables, here we do not 
attempt to also control for a lagged dependent variable or to estimate via the two-step procedure. 
Thus, we only report the usual set of estimates on yearly data. The estimates on the budget surplus 
provide yet more evidence that the sequence matters: economic liberalizations enacted after 
becoming a democracy are associated with smaller improvements in the budget surplus, compared 
to economic liberalizations that come first. The results on gadp and corruption instead suggest that 
economic and political reforms seem to have additive effects, confirming the results obtained when 
considering each reform in isolation. Here the sequence seems unimportant, although the countries 
that enact both reforms do better than the countries that enact only one of them.  
  Finally, we address one last question. Consider countries that had only one reform in our 
sample period, 1960-2000. Some of them were closed in the other (non-reformed) dimension, others 
were open. If the sequence of reforms matters, could the effect of the observed reform differ 
depending on whether the country was open or closed in the other dimension? To answer this 
question, we split the dummy variables lib_1t and dem_1t into a finer partition, allowing the effect 
of lib_1t to differ between democracies and non-democracies, and the effect of dem_1t to differ   23
between countries that were economically open or closed. Here the comparison did not yield 
conclusive results. One reason could simply be lack of data: among the countries experiencing only 
one reform, only three countries (Central African Republic, Iran and Malawi) became democracies 
in closed economic environments, and relatively few opened up the economy while remaining 
dictatorships throughout. In most other cases, the reform took place in countries that were already 
open in the other dimension.  A second possibility is that the distance between the two reforms in 
this group of countries was so large to make them incomparable to the countries undertaking both 
reforms in a closer sequence. Whatever the reason, the inference that the sequence of reforms 
matters is only supported by the sample of countries that undertook both reforms during the 
observed sample period.    
 
5. Why sequencing might matter? 
The main lesson we learn from the joint study of economic and political liberalizations is that the 
sequence matters. Countries that first liberalize the economy, and then make the transition to a 
democracy, do better, in terms of growth, investment, trade volume and macro policies, than those 
that adopt the two reforms in the reverse order. This finding can be interpreted in two alternative 
and non-mutually exclusive ways.  
One possibility is that economic liberalizations enacted first are more effective. This 
interpretation is suggested by the findings on trade volume and inflation: economic liberalization 
first is associated with a sharp increase in trade volumes, both at the time of economic 
liberalizations and then again later on, when the country becomes a democracy; instead, economic 
liberalizations that are preceded by transitions to democracy have much smaller effects on trade. 
Similarly, the reduction in inflation is only observed after an economic liberalization, if this comes 
first. The type of economic liberalization a country adopts thus seems different depending on 
whether it is, or it is not, a democracy. Democracies do tend to liberalize the economy, but trade 
does not expand, suggesting that although the economy is formally open, protection remains 
pervasive, or new non-tariff barriers are introduced to replace formal tariffs. This is not the case 
when the liberalization takes place in a dictatorship. “Dictators” are less likely to open up the 
economy, as suggested by the fewer cases of economic liberalizations under dictatorships. But those 
who do--for instance Chile in 1976, or Guyana in 1988, or Mexico in 1986--if they decide to open 
up, it is because they are able to crush the interest groups that oppose free trade and a market 
system.  Hence liberalization is more pervasive and effective, and less bogged down by 
compromises.   24
The other possibility is that democratizations, when enacted in an open economic 
environment, produce “better” democracies. There are several reasons why this might be the case. 
One reason is that liberalization speeds up growth and introduces a more competitive environment.  
Eventually, when the country gets rid of the dictator and becomes a democracy, it is in some sense, 
a better democracy. First, because it is now open to trade and competition; second because, having 
grown faster for some time, it now has the resources for the redistribution that a democracy 
requires. A young democracy in a closed economic environment, instead, is more likely to bogged 
down in redistributive conflicts and be more unrestrained in the pursuit of populist and inefficient 
policies. A second reason might be that the sequence economic liberalization followed by political 
liberalization might indicate the presence of a controlled and pre-planned liberalization enacted by a 
far sighted leader. When democratization comes first, instead, it is more likely to be unexpected and 
result from violent struggles or collapses of state authority. As such, it is more likely to be 
associated with economic disruptions and redistributive struggles. The data lend some support to 
this interpretation as well. Democratizations that follow liberalizations seem to give an additional 
boost to investment and trade volumes, perhaps because they give more confidence that the open 
economic environment will last over time. This does not happen when democratization comes first. 
Moreover, when democratization comes second, we tend to observe a more gradual improvement in 
the quality of democracy (as measured by the variable POLITY) in between the two liberalization 
episodes – a sign of a more controlled reform process.  
  What does all of this imply for a country that is closed economically and politically and that 
is contemplating economic and political reforms, or for a new-born country e.g. like Iraq? If 
reforms could be administered like medical treatments, then the answer would be clear cut. 
Economic liberalization should come first and receive the strongest priority; only afterwards should 
the country worry about political reform.  But reforms are not ordered by a doctor and the data do 
indicate that autocrats are unlikely to open up the economy. Indeed, most economic liberalizations 
tend to be preceded by political reforms, perhaps imposed by a struggling population on an 
unwilling leader. In this case, the sequence of reforms cannot be chosen ex-ante and the path to 
reform might be less effective from an economic point of view.    25
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Table 1: Countries and years of permanent democratizations and liberalizations 
(Treatment refers to growth regressions) 
 
A.  Countries that received no treatments (controls). 
 In this table some countries are defined as controls even if a liberalization or democratization year appears: it  
means that  the dependent variable was not available in the year of permanent liberalization or democratization, 






Country  year of perm. 
 liberalization 
year of perm.  
democratization
Country  year of perm. 
 liberalization 
year of perm.  
democratization 
Algeria   .  .  Lesotho   .  . 
Angola   .  .  Lithuania   1993  . 
Austria  1960  . Luxembourg  . . 
Azerbaijan 1995  . Malta    . . 
Belarus .  .  Moldova    1994  . 
Belgium  .  . Namibia    . . 
Bulgaria   1991  1990 Netherlands   .  . 
Burkina Faso   1998  .  Nigeria  .  1999 
Burundi   1999  .  Norway   .  . 
Canada   .  .  Pakistan   .  . 
Chad   .  .  Papua New G.  .  . 
China   .  .  Russia   .  . 
Comoros  .  . Rwanda    . . 
Congo .  .  Senegal    .  2000 
Croatia .  1999 Sierra  Leone    .  . 
Cuba   .  .  Slovak Rep.   1991  . 
Czech Republic   1991  .  Slovenia   1991  . 
Denmark    .  . Swaziland  . . 
Eq. Guinea  .  .  Sweden  1960  . 
Estonia    .  . Switzerland  . . 
Finland    1960  . Syria  . . 
France   .  .  Tajikistan  1996  . 
Gabon   .  .  Togo   .  . 
Georgia   1996  .  Ukraine   .  . 
Germany   .  .  United Kingd.  .  . 
Haiti   .  .  United States   .  . 
Hong  Kong  .  . Uzbekistan    . . 
Iceland  .  . Vietnam    . . 
India   .  .  Yemen   .  . 
Italy   .  .  Zaire   .  . 
Kazakhstan   .  .  Zimbabwe   .  . 
Kyrgyzstan   1994  .       
   2
B.    Countries that received one treatment only: democratization 
 
In this table, as in the previous one, some countries are defined as having received only one treatment 
even if a year appears for both liberalization and democratization: it  means that  the dependent 
variable was not available in one of those years, or that the reform took place so late in the sample that 
the last few observations of the dependent variable were discarded.. The same applies for the 
following table. 
 
Country  year of perm. l iberalization  year of perm .democratization 
Albania   1992  1997 
Cambodia   .  1998 
Central African Rep.   .  1993 
Cyprus   1960  1968 
Fiji   .  1990 
Greece   .  1974 
Iran   .  1997 
Malawi .  1994 
Portugal .  1975 
Spain .  1976 
Thailand   .  1992 
 
Countries that received one treatment only: liberalization 
 
Country  year of perm. liberalization  year of perm. democratization 
Armenia   1995  1998 
Australia 1964  . 
Barbados 1966  . 
Botswana 1979  . 
Cameroon   1993  . 
Cape Verde   1991  . 
Colombia   1986  . 
Costa Rica  1986  . 
Egypt 1995  . 
Gambia   1985  . 
Guinea   1986  . 
Guinea-Bissau   1987  1999 
Indonesia   1970  1999 
Ireland   1966  . 
Israel   1985  . 
Ivory Coast   1994  2000 
Jamaica   1989  . 
Japan   1964  . 
Jordan   1965  . 
Kenya   1993  . 
Latvia   1993  . 
Macedonia 1994  . 
Malaysia 1963  . 
Mauritania   1995  . 
Mauritius   1968  . 
Morocco   1984  . 
New Zealand  1986  . 
Niger 1994  1999 
Singapore   1965  . 
South Africa   1991  . 
Sri Lanka  1991  . 
Tanzania   1995  . 
Trin. & Tobago  1992  . 
Tunisia   1989  . 
Uganda   1988  . 




C.  Countries that received 2 treatments 
    
   Democratization  first 
    
Country  year of perm. liberalization  year of perm. democratization 
    
Argentina 1991  1983 
Panama 1996  1989 
Paraguay 1989  1989 
Uruguay 1990  1985 
Bolivia 1985  1982 
Brazil 1991  1985 
Dominican Rep.  1992  1978 
Ecuador 1991  1979 
El Salvador  1989  1982 
Nicaragua 1991  1990 
Guatemala 1988  1986 
Honduras 1991  1980 
Poland 1990  1989 
Romania 1992  1990 
Hungary 1990  1989 
Turkey 1989  1983 
Nepal 1991  1990 
Bangladesh 1996  1991 
Philippines 1988  1986 
Zambia 1993  1991 
Ethiopia 1996  1993 
Mozambique 1995  1994 
Madagascar 1996  1991 
   
    
 
 
   Liberalization  first 
    
Country  year of perm. liberalization  year of perm. democratization 
Chile 1976  1989 
Guyana 1988  1992 
Peru 1991  1993 
Mexico 1986  1994 
Ghana 1985  1996 
Benin 1990  1991 
Mali 1988  1992 
South Korea  1968  1987 
Taiwan 1963  1992 
 
 
   1 
Table 2: Effects of liberalizations on growth and investment  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Dep. Var  growth investment 
                
lib  1.01 0.93   1.42 1.32 1.59  1.98    2.08  2.32 
















                
3y_pre_lib    -0.95        -2.36     
    (0.49)* 
(0.60) 
      (0.42)*** 
(0.88)*** 
  
                
3y_post_lib    0.48        -0.55     
    (0.46) 
(0.44) 
      (0.39) 
(1.00) 
  
                
4yon_post_lib    0.95        2.12     
    (0.44)** 
(0.42)** 
      (0.38)*** 
(1.14)* 
  
                
Treatment  permanent permanent permanent all  all  permanent  permanent  permanent  all  all 
Y*conts  No Yes  No No Yes  No  yes No  No  Yes 
Obs.(countries)  4492(134) 4492(134) 4492(134) 4492(134) 4492(134) 4640(135)  4640(135)  4640(135)  4640(135)  4640(135) 
Adj.R2(within)  0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02  0.08  0.04  0.03  0.08 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%.  
lib = 1 after liberalization 
3y_pre_lib = 1 in the 3 years preceding liberalizations  
3y_post_lib = 1 in the year of liberalization and in the 3 following years  
4yon_post_lib = 1 from the 4
th year and onwards after liberalization 
Y*conts: Y are dummy variables for years; conts are dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin America and for socialist legal origin 
Regressions always include country and year fixed effects, as well as a dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with lib   2 
Table 3: Effects of liberalizations on gadp and corruption  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep. Var  gadp corruption 
            
lib  0.33 0.16   0.33 0.15 0.21 0.15   0.21 0.15 
















            
3y_pre_lib    -0.24      0.03    
    (0.09)*** 
(0.14) 
    (0.08) 
(0.14) 
  
            
3y_post_lib    -0.03      0.10    
    (0.09) 
(0.21) 
    (0.08) 
(0.18) 
  
            
4yon_post_lib    0.59      0.45    
    (0.10)*** 
(0.26)** 
    (0.09)*** 
(0.22)** 
  
            
treatment  permanent permanent permanent all  all  permanent permanent permanent all  all 
Y*conts No Yes  No No Yes  No yes  No No Yes 
Obs.(countries)  1559(106) 1559(106) 1559(106) 1561(106) 1561(106) 1593(106) 1593(106) 1593(106) 1595(106) 1595(106) 
Adj.R2(within)  0.45 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.47 -0.01  0.02 0.00 -0.01  0.02 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%. 
lib = 1 after liberalization 
3y_pre_lib = 1 in the 3 years preceding liberalizations  
3y_post_lib = 1 in the year of liberalization and in the 3 following years  
4yon_post_lib = 1 from the 4
th year and onwards after liberalization 
Y*conts: Y are dummy variables for years; conts are dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin America and for socialist legal origin 
Regressions always include country and year fixed effects, as well as a dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with lib   3 
Table 4: Effects of liberalizations on inflation and surplus  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep. Var  inflation surplus 
            
lib  0.12 -0.15    0.00 -0.17  1.82 2.01   1.47 1.53 
















            
3y_pre_lib    1.16      -0.79    
    (0.08)*** 
(0.18)*** 
    (0.50) 
(0.77) 
  
            
3y_post_lib    0.71      1.34    
    (0.08)*** 
(0.17)*** 
    (0.49)*** 
(1.07) 
  
            
4yon_post_lib    0.22      1.90    
    (0.08)*** 
(0.23) 
    (0.53)*** 
(1.22) 
  
            
treatment  permanent permanent permanent all  all  permanent permanent permanent all  all 
Y*conts No Yes  No No Yes  No yes  No No Yes 
Obs.(countries)  3594(131) 3594(131) 3594(131) 3594(131) 3594(131) 1907(103) 1907(103) 1907(103) 1907(103) 1907(103) 
Adj.R2(within)  0.21 0.33 0.26 0.21 0.33 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%. 
lib = 1 after liberalization 
3y_pre_lib = 1 in the 3 years preceding liberalizations  
3y_post_lib = 1 in the year of liberalization and in the 3 following years  
4yon_post_lib = 1 from the 4
th year and onwards after liberalization 
Y*conts: Y are dummy variables for years; conts are dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin America and for socialist legal origin 
Regressions always include country and year fixed effects, as well as a dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with lib   4 
Table 5: Effects of democratizations on growth and investment  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Dep. Var  growth investment 
                
dem  0.34 0.44   0.64 0.78 0.29  -0.07    0.58  0.48 
















                
3y_pre_dem    -0.67        -0.37     
    (0.61) 
(0.68) 
      (0.51) 
(1.00) 
  
                
3y_post_dem    0.39        0.02     
    (0.56) 
(0.55) 
      (0.47) 
(1.02) 
  
                
4yon_post_dem    0.10        0.34     
    (0.49) 
(0.51) 
      (0.41) 
(1.30) 
  
                
treatment  permanent  permanent  permanent  all  all  permanent permanent permanent all  all 
Y*conts No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No Yes  No No Yes 
Obs.(countries) 4397(138) 4397(138) 4397(138) 4388(138) 4388(138) 4530(150)  4530(150)  4530(150)  4518(150)  4518(150) 
Adj.R2(within)  0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01  0.07  0.01  0.01  0.06 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1% 
dem = 1 after democratizations 
3y_pre_dem = 1 in the 3 years preceding democratizations  
3y_post_dem = 1 in the year of democratizations and in the 3 following years  
4yon_post_dem = 1 from the 4
th year and onwards after democratizations 
Y*conts: Y are dummy variables for years; conts are dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin America and socialist legal origin 
Regressions always include country and year fixed effects, as well as a dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with dem 
    5 
Table 6: Effects of democratizations on gadp and corruption  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep. Var  gadp Corruption 
            
dem  0.29 0.20   0.03 -0.03  0.33 0.30   0.19 0.19 
















            
3y_pre_dem    -0.19      -0.09    
    (0.11)* 
(0.17) 
    (0.08) 
(0.16) 
  
            
3y_post_dem    0.04      0.17    
    (0.11) 
(0.23) 
    (0.09)* 
(0.22) 
  
            
4yon_post_dem    0.49      0.50    
    (0.12)*** 
(0.30) 
    (0.10)*** 
(0.27)* 
  
            
treatment  permanent permanent permanent all  all  permanent permanent permanent all  all 
Y*conts No Yes  No No Yes  No Yes  No No Yes 
Obs.(countries) 1790(122) 1790(122) 1790(122) 1791(122) 1791(122) 1828(122) 1828(122) 1828(122) 1825(122) 1825(122) 
Adj.R2(within)  0.45 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.46 -0.02  0.00 -0.01  -0.03  -0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%. 
dem = 1 after democratizations 
3y_pre_dem = 1 in the 3 years preceding democratizations  
3y_post_dem = 1 in the year of democratizations and in the 3 following years  
4yon_post_dem = 1 from the 4
th year and onwards after democratizations 
Y*conts: Y are dummy variables for years; conts are dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin America and socialist legal origin 
Regressions always include country and year fixed effects, as well as a dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with dem 
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Table 7: Effects of democratizations on inflation and surplus  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep. Var  inflation surplus 
            
dem  0.40 0.17   0.35 0.18 0.89 0.04   1.51 0.99 
















            
3y_pre_dem    0.31      2.06    
    (0.11)*** 
(0.21) 
    (0.69)*** 
(0.94)** 
  
            
3y_post_dem    0.53      1.97    
    (0.10)*** 
(0.23)** 
    (0.66)*** 
(1.15)* 
  
            
4yon_post_dem    0.43      1.21    
    (0.09)*** 
(0.22)* 
    (0.67)* 
(1.24) 
  
            
treatment  permanent permanent permanent all  all  permanent permanent permanent all  all 
Y*conts No Yes  No No Yes  No Yes  No No Yes 
Obs.(countries) 3739(141) 3739(141) 3739(141) 3740(141) 3740(141) 1996(110) 1996(110) 1996(110) 1995(110) 1995(110) 
Adj.R2(within)  0.21 0.32 0.21 0.21 0.32 -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%. 
dem = 1 after democratizations 
3y_pre_dem = 1 in the 3 years preceding democratizations  
3y_post_dem = 1 in the year of democratizations and in the 3 following years  
4yon_post_dem = 1 from the 4
th year and onwards after democratizations 
Y*conts: Y are dummy variables for years; conts are dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin America and socialist legal origin 
Regressions always include country and year fixed effects, as well as a dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with dem 
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Table 8: Effects of liberalizations on democracy and viceversa  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) (10) 







               
Lib  1.14  -0.15    0.79          






        
               
Dem       0.25  0.12    0.12  0.02 








               
5y_pre_treat      2.15    1.86        




      
               
3y_pre_treat    3.08   2.78      0.05    




  (0.02)** 
(0.05) 
  
               
3y_post_treat    2.38   2.00      0.15    




  (0.02)*** 
(0.06)** 
  
               
4yon_post_treat   2.21   1.32      0.32    




  (0.02)*** 
(0.07)*** 
  
               
treatment  permanent  permanent  permanent  all  all  permanent permanent permanent all  all 
Y*conts  No Yes  No No No No  yes  No  No Yes 
Obs.(countries) 4603(132) 4603(132) 4603(132) 4603(132) 4603(132) 4593(132)  4593(132)  4593(132)  4581(132) 4581(132) 
Adj.R2(within)  0.23 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.40  0.50  0.41  0.38 0.50 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%. 
lib (dem)= 1 after liberalization (democratization) 
ny_pre_treat = 1 in the n years preceding treatment (liberalizations or democratizations) 
3y_post_treat = 1 in the 3 years following treatment (liberalizations or democratizations) 
4yon_post_treat = 1 from the 4
th year and onwards after treatment (liberalizations or democratizations) 
Y*conts: Y are dummy variables for years; conts are dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin America and for socialist legal origin 
Regressions always include country and year fixed effects, as well as a dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with lib (columns 
1-5) and with dem (columns 6-10)   8 
Table 9 – Effects of democratizations and liberalizations on growth and investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  growth Investment 
dem_1t  -1.72 0.47  -1.22 0.86  -0.78 -1.88 0.70  -2.03 0.55  -0.56 








(0.69)*** (0.53) (1.02) 
            
lib_1t  0.04 0.86 0.34 1.05 -0.00  1.55 1.42 1.51 1.45 0.49 








(0.42)*** (0.40)*** (0.49) 
            
dem_2t  1.66 1.53 1.07 1.00 0.59 0.42 0.31 0.46 0.49 1.16 








(0.60) (0.43) (1.06) 
            
lib_2t  2.29 2.20 1.44 1.71 1.00 -0.47  2.64 -0.43  2.79 -1.11 








(0.75) (0.55)*** (0.95) 
            
dem_after_lib  -1.23  -1.02  0.84 0.99 -0.46  3.61 1.49 3.47 1.41 3.67 








(0.91)*** (0.78)* (1.40)*** 
            
lib_after_dem  -3.01 -1.88 -2.51 -2.07 -1.89 1.80  -0.35 1.81  -0.40 -0.14 








(0.94)* (0.72)  (1.33) 
            
Lagged income  No No Yes  Yes  No No No Yes  Yes  No 
Estimation  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  2 step  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  2 step 
Treatment  Permanent All  Permanent All  Permanent Permanent All  Permanent All  Permanent 
Obs.(countries) 4243(130) 4229(130) 4079(107) 4065(107) 110  4361(131) 4230(130) 4044(106) 4030(106) 113 
Adj.R2 within  0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.08 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%. 
dem_1t (dem_2t) = 1 after democratizations for countries that did not (did) liberalize  
lib_1t (lib_2t) = 1 after liberalizations for countries that did not (did) democratize  
dem_after_lib (lib_after_dem) = 1 after the second treatment for countries that liberalized first (became dem. first) 
Controls always included: country and year fixed effects, dummy variables for years interacted with dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and socialist legal origin; dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with lib and dem (as defined in the previous tables).   
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Table 10 – Effects of democratizations and liberalizations on inflation and international trade 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Trade inflation 
            
dem_1t  -1.56  -5.22  0.80 -1.09  0.16 0.66 0.16 0.05 -0.03  0.22 








(0.12) (0.09) (0.19) 
            
lib_1t  0.38 0.23 0.93 0.01 0.04 -0.19  -0.01  -0.08  0.01 -0.03 








(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) 
            
dem_2t  -2.81  -1.56  -0.24  0.32 -4.31  0.08 0.11 0.07 0.11 -0.32 








(0.09) (0.07) (0.20) 
            
lib_2t  10.76 8.45  2.61  2.28  1.14  -0.59 -0.84 -0.39 -0.43 -0.11 








(0.13)*** (0.10)*** (0.18) 
            
dem_after_lib  8.98  10.52 1.16  1.23  4.72  -0.43 -0.16 -0.17 -0.07 -0.24 








(0.14) (0.13) (0.27) 
            









(0.16) (0.12) (0.26)*** 
            
Lagged dep var  No No Yes  Yes  No No No Yes  Yes  No 
Estimation  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  2 step  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  OLS, FE  2 step 
Treatment  Permanent  All Permanent All Permanent  Permanent All Permanent All Permanent 
Obs.(countries)  4243(130) 4229(130) 3961(106) 3946(106) 110  3466(127) 3371(126) 2928(88)  2876(88)  81 
Adj.R2 within  0.29 0.30 0.78 0.80 -0.04  0.35 0.34 0.57 0.58 0.11 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%.  
dem_1t (dem_2t) = 1 after democratizations for countries that did not (did) liberalize  
lib_1t (lib_2t) = 1 after liberalizations for countries that did not (did) democratize  
dem_after_lib (lib_after_dem) = 1 after the second treatment for countries that liberalized first (became dem. first) 
Controls always included: country and year fixed effects, dummy variables for years interacted with dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and socialist legal origin; dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with lib and dem (as defined in the previous tables).     10 
Table 11 – Effects of democratizations and liberalizations on surplus, gadp and corruption 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  surplus gadp  corruption 
         
lib_1t  -1.92 2.55  -0.03  -0.11 -0.06 0.06 












         
dem_1t  2.04 1.24 0.02  0.06 0.10 0.14 












         
dem_2t  1.40 -0.73  0.35  -0.06  0.60 0.30 












         
lib_2t  3.58 4.04 0.34  0.14 0.28 0.27 












         
dem_after_lib  -0.29 -0.42 -0.13  0.06  -0.21 0.06 












         
lib_after_dem  -2.95 -1.83 -0.10  0.12  -0.31 -0.16 












         
Treatment  Permanent All  Permanent  All  Permanent All 
Obs.(countries)  1861(101) 1802(100) 1535(104)  1500(103) 1569(104) 1534(103) 
Adj.R2 within  0.07 0.07 0.49  0.51 0.04 0.05 
Standard errors in parentheses (above: OLS; below: clustered); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
 *** significant at 1%. 
dem_1t (dem_2t) = 1 after democratizations for countries that did not (did) liberalize  
lib_1t (lib_2t) = 1 after liberalizations for countries that did not (did) democratize  
dem_after_lib (lib_after_dem) = 1 after the second treatment for countries that liberalized first (became dem. first) 
Controls always included: country and year fixed effects, dummy variables for years interacted with dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and socialist legal origin; dummy variable for socialist legal origin interacted with lib and dem (as defined in the previous tables).    
No lagged dependent variable included; estimation by OLS, FE   11 
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Figure 3  Estimated residuals for controls (always) and treated (top panel: before democracy; bottom 
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APPENDIX 
 






















Graphs by (mean) mtreat
 
 
The horizontal axis measures the estimated probability of treatment – i.e. of having at least one reform (either economic or political liberalization) - 
conditional upon being in Africa, Asia, Latin America and on having a socialist legal origin.  The vertical axis measures the number of countries 
having this estimated probability., by group of countries:  
-  Group 1 are the countries that had no reform at all (ie they are the control countries) 
-  Group 2 are the countries that had political liberalization only 
-  Group 3 are the countries that had economic liberalization only 
-  Group 4 are the countries that had both economic and political liberalization 
 